The Final Verdict on Operation Barbarossa

Just a few days ago, Antelope Hill published Germany in Stalin’s Crosshairs, an English translation of the German original by Dr. Bernd Schwipper a former General in the Nationale Volksarmee, the army of the German Democratic Republic.

Originally published in 2016, Deutschland im Visier Stalins has long remained virtually outside the frame of reference of historians unable to read German. This is truly unfortunate, since all they had to rely on for correcting the accepted narrative on the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was the work by Viktor Suvorov, beginning with Icebreaker, ֗first published in 1989, with the English translation appearing in 1990. In this and several other works Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun—Suvorov’s real name—argued that Stalin was planning to attack Germany, but that Hitler beat him to it in the nick of time. Since Suvorov had convincing arguments but at best circumstantial evidence for his stance, most leading historians in the West, those whose voice counted most in establishing “historical correctness,” rather haughtily dismissed his books.

There was, however, the occasional courageous historian who ventured out and took up Suvorov. One of these was Dutch historian Marius Broekmeyer, who in 2006 published Bedrogen bedriegers. Stalin Contra Hitler (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt), arguing that Stalin was indeed planning to invade Germany, although not immediately. Broekmeyer identifies Gabriel Gorodetsky as the most vociferous proponent of the theory that the USSR had no plans to attack in 1941 (or afterward). But according to Broekmeyer, Gorodetsky and other mainstream historians conspicuously avoid addressing their opponents’ arguments: “They shout that it is a shame; they are in denial, but I have not yet seen them refute the arguments of Danilov, Ho֖mann, Doroshenko, Magenheimer, Bobylev, Maser, Meltyukhov, Dashichev, Suvorov, Topitsch, Nevezhin, Vladimir Sokolov and Post” (p. 229). While each of those historians has added facts and arguments to those ֗first put forward by Suvorov,ⁱ none of them has produced the kind of solid, extensively documented and rigorous study that General Schwipper has written.

What we have been seeing in the debate on Operation Barbarossa is symptomatic for the way in which the Western academic historic environment functions. Apart from “historical correctness” in the West, another reason for the almost universal dismissal of Suvorov’s thesis is the fact that most Russian historians also refused to support Suvorov. This “scholarly consensus” that has helped to preserve much of the accepted narrative on the Second World War. American revisionist historian Harry Elmer Barnes has called this mechanism of collective reaction by the historical establishment, the blackballing of anyone who steps out of line, the “historical blackout.”ⁱⁱ It happened to Barnes himself, after in 1926 he had published an alternative vision of the origins of World War One.ⁱⁱⁱ Subsequently, Barnes distanced himself even further, as he began to write about contemporary politics from a non-interventionist, pacifist angle, further angering the academic establishment.

Against this intellectual and political background, the publication of an English translation of General Schwipper’s work is crucially important. Mainstream historians, especially those entrenched in the ivory towers of prestigious academies, colleges and universities will no longer be able to maintain that Hitler committed an unforced error by ordering Operation Barbarossa on a whim. General Schwipper proves unequivocally that Stalin was indeed planning to invade Germany and Western Europe, and that in 1940 he initiated comprehensive military and industrial preparations on a vast scale. In the ֗first place because the author has seen all the relevant, available Soviet government and military sta֖ff documents, both published and unpublished. It should be underlined that, unlike the leading Western historians, the author is thoroughly familiar with the Russian language. Secondly, because unlike any historian in the West, General Schwipper holds a doctorate in military science and has been a career officer. He received his own general staff֖ training in Moscow. Thus, sheer knowledge and vast experience have made him uniquely quali֗fied to research the circumstances under which Operation Barbarossa was launched. And armed with these qualifications, Schwipper spent 15 years on researching and writing this book. It is a milestone of World War Two historical research, because, at least in the West, it will make it inevitable to rewrite entire sections of the standard narrative.

In an ideal world, all historians specializing in the history of World War II, in military history, in the history of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, of 20^thcentury Europe (and those numbers must run in the thousands worldwide), should hurry to get a copy of Bernd Schwipper’s book. All the more so, since today ever fewer historians and academics (unless they are Germans, Austrians or Swiss) are able to read German. Now that they finally have access to this seminal work on World War II history, they will finally be able to correct their necessarily distorted vision of that period. Actually, it is imperative they do so, because if they continue to hold on to their cherished and unchallenged vision, they will implicitly disqualify themselves as experts in their academic field.

Bernd Schwipper’s book will likely serve as a kind of icebreaker, breaking open the frozen waters of World War II historiography, especially in the English-speaking world and those parts of the world where English is virtually the only foreign language that academics understand (like China, Japan and many other Asian countries).

After reading Germany in Stalin’s Crosshairs, any true historian will surely want to read more of such shocking books. This makes the publication of this book such an important event, because it may lead eventually to a much needed revision of World War II and 20^th century history.

i Valeri Danilov, “Hat der Generalsstab der Roten Armee einen Präventivschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1993:1, 41–51; Joachim Ho֖mann, “Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion 1941”, in: Zwei Wege nach Moskau. Vom Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bis zum “Unternehmen Barbarossa”, Munich and Zurich, 1991; Heinz Magenheimer, Der deutsche Angriff auf Sowjetrussland 1941. Das operative Problem in Planung und Ablauf des Feldzuges. Dissertation, Vienna University, 1969; Pavel Bobylev, “Tochku v diskussii stavit rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v General’nyi shtab RKKA v 1941g.?” Otechestvennaya istoriya 2000:1, 41–64; Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Munich, 1994; Mikhail Meltyukhov, Upuschennyi Shans Stalina. Sovetsky Soyuz y borba za Evropu. Moscow, 2000; Vyacheslav Dashichev, “Pakt Gitlera-Stalina. Mify y realnost,” Istoriki otvechayut na voprosy, Moscow, 1990, 262–273; Ernst Topitsch, “‘Barbarossa’ – ein Präventivkrieg?” Geschichte und Gegenwart 1989:8, 1–15; Vladimir Nevezhin, “The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an ‘O֖ffensive War’ (1939-1941)”, Journal of Soviet Military Aτairs, December 1995, 809–844; Vladimir Sokolov, “Did Stalin Intend to Attack Hitler?” Journal of Soviet/Slavic Military Studies, 1998, 113–141; and Walter Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa. Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffspläne 1940/41, Hamburg 1995.

ii Harry Elmer Barnes, The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout, 9th edition, 1952.

iii Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War. An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.